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Between the end of the 1960's and the mid 1980's, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and its various offshoots pioneered an innovative terrorist strategy, along with several 
related tactics. The PFLP's innovation lay, first, in the identification of the global community as the 
primary target audience for Palestinian activism; second, in the selection of the aviation system as 
the prime target for their attacks; and third, in the incorporation of foreign nationals into their 
operations. Offshoots of the PFLP extended this strategy, pioneering significant micro-tactical 
innovations. These innovations enabled the PFLP and its offshoots to execute some of the most 
dramatic operations seen in the 20th century, setting a trend that would only be broken decades later 
by the September 11th, 2001, attacks. Further, these attacks provided a template not only for other 
Palestinian groups, but for terrorist groups all over the world. This makes the PFLP's record a good 
starting point for exploring the factors that produce and drive innovation within terrorist 
organizations. In turn, this exploration builds a solid platform for discussing the extent that security 
organizations, knowing these factors, can predict and undercut the emergence of innovative 
capacities in both contemporary and future terrorist networks.  
 
The Rise of the PFLP's International Terrorism Strategy 
After Israel's decisive victory in the Six Day War, Palestinian resistance groups realized their hopes 
of liberation would not be fulfilled by the armies of Arab states and that they would have to pursue 
their radical agenda on their own. Lacking a conventional military, many in the resistance movement 
argued that they should engage in guerrilla/terrorist warfare against Israel, operating out of the 
newly occupied territories and relying on the strategic depth of neighboring Arab countries. 
However, the terrain of the West Bank was unsuitable for this style of warfare, and the Arab states 
were unwilling to support their Palestinian brethren. These factors, combined with the fact that 
Israel reacted effectively to those attacks that were carried out, led many militant Palestinian leaders 
back to the proverbial drawing board. This re-evaluation sparked a revolutionary approach to 
terrorism in the minds of PFLP leaders.  
Steered by George Habash and Waddia Haddad −	  Christian Palestinians trained as physicians at the 
American University in Beirut −	   the PFLP was born out of a merger between several earlier 
organizations, most notably, the Arab Nationalist Movement, Youth for Revenge, and the Palestine 
Liberation Front. From its inception, the PFLP was dedicated to the expulsion of Jews from Israel 
and, more broadly, to the Pan-Arabist belief that the Arabs must unite to overthrow Western 
imperialism and the reactionary puppet regimes it had installed in the Arab world.   
In a 1967 meeting of the organization's leadership, Waddia Haddad, then the leader of the group's 
military wing, leveled a direct challenge to the strategy of guerrilla operations: “Trying to get men 
and weapons across the Jordan into Israel is a waste of time and effort. Armed struggle of that type 
will never achieve the liberation of Palestine… We have to hit the Israeli army in a qualitative way, 
not quantitative way. This is a particular animal, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]; we cannot fight it 
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plane for plane, tank for tank, soldier for soldier. We have to hit the Israelis at the weak joints”.10 His 
proposed solution involved a major strategic shift:  
What do I mean by the weak joints? I mean spectacular, one-off operations. These spectacular 
operations will focus the world’s attention on the problem of Palestine. The world will ask, ‘What the 
hell is the problem in Palestine? Who are these Palestinians? Why are they doing these things?’ At the 
same time, such operations will be highly painful for the Israelis. High-profile, sensational operations, 
carried out by thoroughly trained people in secure underground structures – this is how we shall hit 
at the painful joints. In the end, the world will get fed up with its problem; it will decide it has to do 
something about Palestine. It will have to give us justice.11 
Elaborating, Haddad explained that the main idea was to hijack an El Al airliner and to hold its 
passengers and crew hostage. Haddad claimed that if such an operation failed to get the attention of 
international media, then probably nothing could succeed in achieving this goal. “It shouldn’t be 
necessary to use actual violence. We don’t even have to hit Israeli targets all the time. But we must 
be a constant irritation, a bug under the skin of the developed world. We must make them lose 
patience with Israel and Palestine that hard way.”12 While these actions would not precipitate Israel's 
downfall, they would, Haddad argued, draw sufficient international attention to the Palestinian 
problem and force a resolution. In the following months, Haddad created a separate special 
operations unit dedicated to executing such international operations.  
Palestinian operatives developed this innovative strategy through the experience of executing 
spectacular attacks. The first hijackings were designed to impact Western public opinion and to 
inflate the power image of Palestinian groups, demonstrating their ability to attack Western targets if 
their demands and national agenda were not met. At the same time, the new strategy aimed to 
coerce the release of prisoners in Israeli jails and, later, the release of failed hijackers who were 
caught during their missions. These tactics were rapidly adopted by other Palestinian groups as well 
as other international terrorist groups.  
In July 1968, five members of the new unit were deployed, hijacking an El Al flight from Rome to 
Tel-Aviv. The kidnappers forced the plane to divert to Algeria, carrying 36 passengers and ten 
crewmembers. After landing, the kidnappers released the non-Israeli passengers. The remaining five 
passengers and seven crewmembers were held hostage in an Algerian police station near the airport. 
As Haddad hoped, the airline’s hijacking became an international incident; Israel, faced with an 
unfamiliar challenge, turned to the US for help. All US attempts to find a swift resolution failed, and 
the crisis dragged out until September, ultimately coming to resolution through Italian mediation. In 
August 1969, the PFLP followed up on this initial foray, deploying two operatives to take control of 
TWA flight 840 from Los Angeles to Tel Aviv. Claiming that they launched the attack in retaliation 
against US military aid to Israel, the hijackers landed the aircraft in Syria, deplaned the hostages, and 
blew up the cockpit.13 The US demanded that Syria arrange the release of all hostages, but the Assad 
regime declined, allowing only a dozen crewmembers and 93 non-Israeli passengers to leave. Two 
male Israeli hostages were released at the end of October 1969, only after Israel agreed to release 
some Egyptian soldiers.  
This strategic innovation soon gave rise to tactical innovations as well, such as ground attacks on 
European airports. For example, in December 1968 a parked El Al airplane was attacked at Athens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bassam Abu-Sharif and Uzi Mahnaimi, Tried by Fire, (London: Little Brown & Co., 1995) p. 59. 
11 Ibid, pp. 59-60. 
12 Ibid pp. 59-60. 
13 Timothy Naphtali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, (New York: Basic Books, 2005) pp. 35-36. 
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International Airport. One mechanic was killed and two others were injured.14 In February 1969, 
four PFLP operatives opened fire and threw grenades at an El Al airline while it was departing 
Zurich Airport, killing an Israeli co-pilot, three other crew members, and injuring three passengers.  
An Israeli air marshal managed to kill one of the terrorists, while the three other operatives were 
eventually captured.15 
Habash's organization declared it would broaden its worldwide activities and focus, not only on 
Israeli targets, but on any target that belonged to the US-led “imperialistic world.”16 Throughout the 
summer and fall of 1969, the PFLP bombed several European and Israeli targets, including three 
Israeli related-businesses and a Marks and Spencer shop in London.17 In September, the PFLP 
extended its scope to targets in the Netherlands, Belgium, and West Germany. These attacks 
expanded the plan to attract Western attention and built on the group's declared agenda of 
international revolution. The success of the first operations encouraged them to continue with this 
second gambit. Haddad personally selected all targets and supervised every operation.  
These high-profile operations were not only tactical successes, but strategic victories as well. As 
Haddad had predicted, they brought international attention to the Palestinian problem. Their success 
also significantly boosted the PFLP's stature among Palestinian groups. In 1969, after the PFLP 
accepted Iraqi and Soviet sponsorship, Habash's organization fully capitalized on its increasing 
popularity, nearly tripling its size and significantly upgrading its capabilities. These improvements 
were on full display when the organization launched the so-called "airplane operations" – the most 
spectacular, innovative undertaking it has attempted to date.  
 
The “Airplanes Operation”: The Pinnacle of PFLP’s International Operations  
Building on the success of the earlier hijackings, Haddad resolved to hijack not one, but three 
airplanes en route to New York – selecting an American target because attacking American 
objectives led to the highest level of media attention. The planes were all to be landed on the same 
isolated strip in Jordan (an Arab country targeted for reasons beyond the scope of this paper). The 
operation was launched on September 6th, 1970, when TWA flight 741, en route from Frankfurt, 
was hijacked with 141 passengers and 10 crewmembers aboard. The next airline to be hijacked was 
Swissair flight 100 from Zurich, with 143 passengers and 12 crewmembers aboard.  
While the first two hijackings went according to plan, the third hijacking, El Al flight 219, 
Amsterdam to New York, did not. According to Haddad’s plan, an operative from a left-wing 
Nicaraguan guerrilla group and a Palestinian woman by the name of Leila Khaled would pose as a 
married couple to deceive El Al security personnel in Amsterdam. Two other operatives were 
supposed to infiltrate the plane in the traditional fashion. While the “married” couple managed to 
board the plane, the other two, of Palestinian origin, were not allowed to board, but were also not 
arrested by the authorities.18 Shortly after takeoff, the two remaining operatives attempted to hijack 
the plane. The Israeli pilot, who had been trained in counter-terrorism tactics −	  a direct result of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  “Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s Terrorism Knowledge Base”, <www.tkb.org>, [MIPT TKB].    




18 Abu-Sharif and Mahnaimi  81. 
Strategic Insights • Summer 2011 Volume 10, Issue 2 19
1968 Algeria hijacking −	  turned the plane sharply and entered it into a steep nose-dive.19 As a result, 
the hijackers lost their footing and an undercover Israeli security officer shot and killed the male 
operative. A group of passengers leaped from their seats, charged Khaled, and started beating her. 
Khaled pulled the safety pin from the hand-grenade that she was carrying and tossed it. 20
 
Fortunately, the grenade did not explode. Her actions, however, indicate that she was ready to turn 
the operation from a hijacking into a suicide attack. After the passengers took control of Khaled, the 
pilot turned the plane back and made an emergency landing in London. Khaled was arrested 
immediately after landing.21 
The implementation of Haddad’s plan suffered from another complication. The two Palestinians 
who were turned away by El Al security decided to ignore Haddad’s directions and improvise 
instead. The operatives bought tickets on Pan Am flight 93 to New York and successfully hijacked 
the plane, its 153 passengers, and 17 crewmembers. This airplane, however, was not suitable for 
Haddad’s plan; Pan Am flight 93 flew a Boeing-747, which was too large for the sandy landing strip 
in Jordan. The kidnappers were ordered to divert the flight to Beirut and load it with explosives. 
After that, they would fly to Egypt and blow up the plane at Cairo International Airport after 
evacuating all the hostages. The PFLP's intention for this improvised plan was to embarrass Egypt 
for announcing its ceasefire with Israel, which ended "the war of attrition" in the Suez Canal.22 
The Swissair and TWA flights landed as planned at an abandoned British airport in Jordan known as 
“Dawson’s field,” later renamed the “Revolution Airport.” PFLP operatives waited on the ground 
and helped in securing the plane and handling the hundreds of hostages. Among those at the field 
was the commander and mastermind of the operation, Waddia Haddad.23 After completing the 
hijacking phase of the operation, the PFLP announced that they were not targeting US civilians 
themselves, but rather the US administration's policies. On the practical level, the PFLP demanded 
the release of terrorists held by the countries who had citizens among the hostages. As the United 
States held no terrorists in its prisons, Haddad announced that the US hostages would be released 
after all other countries had complied. In exchange for the release of the Swiss hostages the PFLP 
demanded that the Swiss government release several terrorists from Swiss prisons. A similar demand 
was made of the West German government. The British government was presented with a demand 
to promptly release Leila Khaled. Israel was required to release several Palestinian prisoners in 
exchange for the release of the Israeli and dual-nationality (where one nationality was Israeli) 
hostages.  
The negotiations, conducted by the International Red Cross, started the day after the hijacking and 
dragged out for some time. The United States spent their political capital convincing the nations 
involved to present a unified front and to agree to release their terrorist prisoners only on the 
condition that all hostages, regardless of nationality, would be released as well.24
 
Two incidents took place during the negotiations. On the third day of the crisis, Haddad received a 
report from Beirut that a BOAC airliner out of Bombay was en route to Dawson. Haddad originally 
suspected that it was a rescue mission, but soon discovered that a Palestinian PFLP supporter had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid, 82. 
20 According to some of the reports it was the male operative who dropped the grenade. 
21 Abu-Sharif and Mahnaimi, 81. 
22 Ibid. 82. 
23 Ibid. 84. 
24 Naphtali 43. 
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privately hijacked the plane after he heard about the arrest of the famous Leila Khaled.25 However, 
Haddad was still concerned about the possibility of a rescue attempt, and worried that Jordan, 
heavily embarrassed by the crisis, would attempt to end it by force. Therefore, with the media in 
attendance, Haddad evacuated the guarded hostages and then blew up the planes.26 The videos and 
photographs of this scene became some of the best known graphic symbols of the Palestinian 
international terrorist movement in particular and of international terrorism in general. This event 
epitomizes the whole strategic aim of the new PFLP strategy to force the world, at gunpoint, to pay 
attention to the Palestinian problem. Haddad's actions in Jordan gave him that attention in full.  
The crisis ended formally on September 30th, with the western European nations exchanging 
imprisoned terrorists for their hostages. Even Israel agreed to release some Palestinian prisoners, 
although officially this release was claimed to be unrelated to the hijacking.27 The tactical victories of 
the airplane operation, though, were quickly translated into strategic difficulties, sparking harsh 
reprisals from Jordan and a significant global backlash. The consequences were so severe they 
convinced Habash that it was necessary to curb the PFLP's international operations. Haddad, 
though, was unwilling to retreat. Ironically, Haddad's most innovative operation led to his departure 
from the PFLP, along with his special operations unit. This separation shifted the center of gravity 
from the PFLP to Haddad's splinter organization. However, the PFLP remained a presence among 
global extremists, albeit one less oriented towards terrorism.  
 
PFLP-External Operations (PFLP-EO, a.k.a.: The Waddia Haddad Faction)  
In addition to devising the international operations strategy, Haddad was the chief planner and 
senior commander of each operation even though he kept such a low a profile he remains almost an 
obscure figure even today. He also devised the training program for the PFLP's special operations 
unit — a training program he continued with his new offshoot and significantly upgraded. The first 
stage of training included standard military skills. During this initial stage, Haddad's handpicked 
officers singled out those recruits with the highest degree of intelligence, mental strength, physical 
stamina, and persistence. These recruits, after completing the entry-level regime, were selected for 
special operations training.28 This advanced training program, wholly of Haddad's making, was 
strongly geared towards preparing the operatives to execute missions targeting airlines. It focused 
heavily on techniques designed to overcome both pre-flight and on-board security measures. In 
some cases, trainees even learned how to pilot airplanes—in case the pilots were injured or killed 
during the initial takeover, and the operatives had to land the plane themselves.29 Haddad's personal 
involvement in the training process created strong bonds between himself and his operatives, with 
many of them idealizing him as a commander and as a human being. In many ways, they were more 
Haddad's people than PFLP operatives. 
In order to further improve his unit’s capabilities, Haddad took the unorthodox step of accepting 
non-Palestinian volunteers, who were often motivated by a combination of sympathy for the 
Palestinian cause and a desire to acquire the same skills for their own radical agendas. This decision 
not only lent the organization an international flavor that fit well with their nominal Marxism, but, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Abu-Sharif and Mahnaimi 84-85. 
26 Ibid. 87. 
27 MIPT-TKB 
28 Ibid. 64. 
29 Ibid. 64-65. 
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more importantly, it offered a way to circumvent "racial" profiling. This tactic was tested in the 1970 
hijacking of the El Al plane in Amsterdam; while the two Palestinian operatives were stopped by 
security, the other two operatives −	   a Nicaraguan and a Palestinian woman who had undergone 
plastic surgery −	  successfully boarded the plane. Among the first to qualify under Haddad were the 
future founders of the Baader-Meinhoff group. Over the years, Haddad cemented further relations 
with the West German June 2nd
 
Movement (Bewegung 2. Juni), the Italian Red Brigades (Brigate 
Rosse), the Japanese Red Army, the Basque ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), the Turkish THKO 
(Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu), the French Action Directe,30 and the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army. 31  In addition, Haddad recruited foreign volunteers who were not members of known 
organizations but who expressed a willingness to fight for the Palestinian cause. The most notable of 
those operatives was the Venezuelan Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, better known as “Carlos.”32 
Haddad was a great believer in developing innovative technological tools for his special operations. 
He specifically recruited engineering and chemistry professionals from all over the Arab world.33 
Among the major fields of research in Haddad's organization was the development of tools to 
overcome the airport security measures. PFLP’s engineers tried to develop various explosive devices 
that could pass through x-ray screening machines −	   a counter-innovation starting to appear in 
airports around the world −	  without raising suspicion. 
Another development of Haddad’s special unit was a liquid explosive that resembled red wine. For 
the initial test of this explosive, Haddad decided to use a South-African operative of Arab origin. 
The man was so enthusiastic to participate in special operations that he declared his willingness to 
carry out a suicide mission. Haddad agreed. This was probably the first time the PFLP planned to 
carry out a suicide attack, an unknown phenomenon at that time.  The special explosive was poured 
into an ordinary Chianti bottle that was sealed with red wax. All the operative had to do was to 
remove the wrapping from the bottle, which should have made it explode. The operation failed after 
the operative hesitated and was caught by Israeli authorities.34 In another case, a group of Haddad’s 
operatives was caught while carrying explosives hidden inside ceramic artifacts and religious icons.35
 
 
Haddad's original ideas saw extensive deployment in the following years. One of the first to be 
carried out was the attempted assassination of Lord Joseph Sieff, president of Marks and Spencer 
and a known supporter of Israel. The assassination attempt was carried out in December 1973 and 
failed.36 The attack is considered the first operation for “Carlos” and may have served as a test of his 
courage and loyalty.37 In another noteworthy event, Haddad's group took over the Japanese embassy 
in Kuwait and successfully negotiated the release of embassy staff in exchange for two Palestinians 
and two members of the Japanese Red Army, who had collaborated on an attack in Singapore. It 
seems that Haddad went to this effort because the Japanese, able to travel easily across Europe, were 
turning from "operational contractors" into an integral part of Haddad's special unit.38
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid. 67. 
31 Claire Sterling, The Terror Network, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), pp. 158-159. 
32 Abu-Sharif and Mahnaimi 71-72. 
33 Abu-Sharif and Mahnaimi 73-74. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Interview with a former senior Israeli security official, Jerusalem, August 23rd, 2007. 
36 MIPT-TKB. 
37 Yallop, To the Ends of the Earth: The Hunt for the Jackal, (London: Corgi Books, 1994), 343. 
38 Ibid. 79. 
Strategic Insights • Summer 2011 Volume 10, Issue 2 22
Subsequently, in order to disrupt the possibility of peace talks between Israel and the PLO, Haddad 
masterminded two attempts to shoot down El Al planes in France, at the behest of his Iraqi patrons. 
Both attempts failed. In the aftermath of the second, three operatives, under fire from Israeli 
security, withdrew into the airport terminal and captured several hostages. After negotiations 
conducted under the auspices of the Egyptian ambassador to France, they released the hostages and 
were allowed to leave the country. Many countries refused to allow the attackers to land in their 
territory, hoping to avoid the appearance of supporting the attack or jeopardizing their relations with 
France. Ultimately, Iraq was "forced" to allow the operatives to land, ironically because of a direct 
request from France.  
Throughout the mid 1970s, Haddad invested heavily in concocting what some have described as 
"shock value" operations. For instance, Haddad compiled a hit list of hundreds of targets,39
 
including 
names that had no connection to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but were sufficiently high profile to draw 
attention to the Palestinian struggle. In 1974, the organization set off a triple car bombing of the 
offices of three French newspapers that supported Israel. A fourth car bomb was discovered before 
it could be detonated.  
In 1975, Iraq tasked Haddad with a special operation: storming OPEC headquarters in Vienna 
during a gathering of ministers from member states. The Iraqis gave Haddad free rein to plan the 
attack as he saw fit, but instructed him to kill the Saudi and Iranian oil ministers. Haddad devised a 
plan to take over the headquarters and kidnap the oil ministers, eventually releasing them in 
exchange for a plane to the Middle East. Each minister would be released only after he publicly 
denounced the possibility of dialog with Israel. This part of the plan was intended to get widespread 
media attention and to hide Iraq’s involvement.  
While Haddad was the man behind the plan, he decided to give the responsibility for executing it to 
“Carlos.” Haddad selected operatives from members of the June 2nd Movement, since the Baader-
Meinhof gang declined to participate and the Japanese were unsuitable for such a mission. The 
operatives included three Palestinians, two Germans and Carlos as their commander.40 The mixed 
international background of perpetrators was not unusual, because Haddad was known to assign 
operatives from several countries to the same operation.41 The involvement of the Palestinians was 
based on the assumption that they would be more determined executors, as well as Haddad’s desire 
that the operation have a direct and clear linkage to the Palestinian issue. Haddad was directly 
involved in the training of the operatives for the planned OPEC operation. The Iraqis provided 
weapons and intelligence as they had for other operations in the past.42
  
The storming of the OPEC building in December 1975 went as planned and without any special 
difficulties. Carlos identified himself to the 70 hostages using his full name and credited the 
operation to “The Arm of the Arab Revolution.” The PLO was quick to denounce the attack and it 
was even condemned by the PFLP.43 After intensive negotiation, the kidnappers’ demands were met 
and they were allowed to leave with their hostages to Algeria. Against the direct orders of Haddad, 
Carlos accepted the Algerian president's offer to release all of the hostages without killing the two 
ministers as required by the Iraqis. In exchange, the kidnappers would get ransom from the relevant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid. pp. 109-110. 
40 Ibid. 380. 
41 Abu-Sharif and Mahnaimi, 67. 
42 Yallop 381. 
43 Ibid. 409. 
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countries. According to one publication, Carlos claimed that he decided to take the offer because he 




Taking high-ranking ministers hostage in an operation including foreign nationals virtually 
guaranteed Haddad extensive media coverage — and a commensurate rise in the group's 
international profile. Further, they had fired a shot across the bow of oil-wealthy accomodationist 
Arab regimes, strongly incentivizing them to invest more heavily in resolving the Palestinian issue. 
The aftermath of the operation also worked in Haddad's favor: by cashiering Carlos for his 
insubordination, Haddad bolstered his image of uncompromising leadership.  
 
Audacity and Innovation in Aerial Attacks  
In 1976, Haddad launched yet another attempt to shoot down an Israeli plane and kill its passengers, 
targeting an El Al aircraft as it touched down in Nairobi, Kenya. For this attack, he put together a 
team combining experienced members of his organization and German operatives. The attempt was 
thwarted when Kenyan authorities, apparently acting on information provided by Israel, arrested the 
entire cell. The terrorists were transferred covertly to Israel for interrogation.  
This failure did not dissuade Haddad from further attempts to attack aviation targets. In fact, the 
need to secure the release of the Nairobi cell only added additional incentive.45 In July 1976, Haddad 
dispatched a second cell to hijack Air France flight 139 (Tel Aviv to Paris via Athens), carrying 
primarily Israeli passengers. This operation succeeded. The operatives forced the plane to land in 
Entebbe, Uganda, and demanded that the hostages be exchanged for imprisoned comrades—
including the three arrested for the Kenya attacks. While the hijacking itself went according to the 
plan, the operation ended in failure when Israeli commandos raided the plane and rescued the 
passengers and crew. All of the kidnappers were killed during the rescue mission.   
In 1977, Haddad was diagnosed with leukemia. Despite his illness, Haddad continued to develop 
operational plans, including a repeat of an Entebbe-type hijacking intended to secure the release of 
the Baader-Meinhof members. The special training for this operation was conducted in Iraq and 
personally supervised by Haddad. In October 1977, operatives hijacked Lufthansa flight 181 (Palma 
de Mallorca to Frankfurt) and diverted it to Mogadishu in another attempt to release the German 
prisoners. Again, Haddad failed after GSG-9, the German counter-terrorist unit, successfully 
rescued the passengers and crew.46 Most of the kidnappers died during the German raid. Worth 
noting is the fact that the leader of the kidnappers was involved, several months earlier, in the killing 
of several North Yemen officials in London.47 It is possible that Haddad planned this operation on 
behalf of the government of South Yemen, where he resided for most of the 1970's before to 
moving to Baghdad.  
The Mogadishu operation was Haddad's third major failure, with a high cost in both funds and 
skilled operatives. This, combined with Haddad's deteriorating health, effectively spelled the end of 
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the Haddad faction. Haddad died from leukemia in an East Berlin hospital on March 30, 1978 at the 
age of 48.  
 
 
May 15 Organization (Abu-Ibrahim Faction)  
Two factions emerged from the ruins of the Haddad group. One, the May 15 Organization, was 
founded in Iraq by Hussein Mohammad al Umari, AKA “Abu-Ibrahim”. Al Umari, a Palestinian 
refugee raised in Lebanon and Syria, joined the PFLP because of his support for George Habash's 
ideas. He named his organization after the date that symbolized the birth of the State of Israel and 
the Palestinian catastrophe.48 Al Umari fully embraced Haddad's flair for innovation and daring, 
along with “the Master's” belief that, in order to achieve the desired effect, it would be necessary to 
attack not only Israeli objectives but also American ones, and even those belonging to moderate 
Arab countries.49 From an early stage, al Umari decided to focus his operations against airlines. But 
while Haddad was interested in hijacking planes, al Umari tried to blow them up while they were still 
airborne. Accordingly, he invested heavily in developing advanced explosives capabilities along with 
innovative tactics to circumvent the heightened security measures adopted in many of the world's 
airports. 
One of the most famous products of al Umari's research was a suitcase with explosive material 
woven directly into the fabric.50 Lacking any suspicious external marks, it was thought to be unlikely 
that, even if airport security personnel found the cases suspicious, they'd be able to identify the 
explosives. Each suitcase contained a relatively small amount of explosives, but it was more than 
enough to bring down an airliner in flight.51 Invented while he was still a member of the Haddad 
faction, this device would become an al Umari trademark.  
In 1982, the May 15 Organization fully deployed its next-generation abilities, dispatching 
Muhammad Rashid, the organization's top operations expert, on one of the most innovative attacks 
ever seen on the international stage. During June of that year, Rashid left Baghdad and, in 
accordance with al Umari's guidelines, stayed in Singapore as a regular tourist for a short period of 
time to avoid raising suspicion. After that, Rashid took his family with him on a Pan Am flight from 
Hong Kong to Tokyo. Al Umari correctly assumed that a man flying with his family would escape 
suspicion; authorities did not expect a terrorist to bring his own family with him during an attack. 
During the flight, Rashid took a concealed explosive device from his carry-on luggage and hid it 
inside his seat. The device was built with a barometric fuse that would detonate the bomb during the 
plane’s next flight. After their arrival in Tokyo, Rashid and his family stayed a couple days in Japan 
before returning to Baghdad.52 Meanwhile, the Pan Am plane took off on flight 830 to Hawaii with 
267 passengers aboard, most of them Japanese. Shortly before landing, the bomb exploded. The 
passenger sitting in Rashid's seat died instantly. 28 other passengers were injured. The bomb tore a 
wide hole into the fuselage and released the cabin's air pressure. Fortunately, the pilot was able to 	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regain control and make an emergency landing, saving the passengers.53 Two more attacks were 
launched in the following weeks, with bombs planted on a Pan Am flight from Miami to Rio de 
Janeiro and another on board a plane in a Tokyo airport. Fortunately, these bombs were found 
before detonation. 
Japanese and American authorities quickly discovered that the explosion was a terrorist attack, but 
had difficulty finding suspects capable of such a sophisticated plan. 54  Eventually, Western 
intelligence agencies exposed al Umari's organization and launched an aggressive intelligence 
campaign against it. 
Al Umari remained determined to target the aviation industry and to cause massive casualties among 
Americans, Israelis, and anyone who flew with them to and from Israel. In other words, he 
continued the original strategy of Haddad’s organization while improving its methods. Al Umari 
continued to plan and execute innovative operations against the aviation system, even while he was 
being pursued by the West. In December 1983, al Umari sent a British woman to Israel with a 
suitcase −	  unknown to her −	  equipped with Semtex-type explosives and a barometric fuse that was 
supposed to detonate shortly after takeoff.55 The woman boarded an El Al plane leaving Tel-Aviv on 
its way to London, with 260 passengers aboard. However, the bomb, which went undetected by 
Israeli airline security, did not explode as planned. When the woman arrived in London, she claimed 
the suitcase and took it with her, still unaware of the explosives it contained. On the same day, 
security personnel in Italy noticed that a Palestinian did not board his scheduled flight to New York, 
even though he had already checked his luggage. This made security suspicious, so they removed the 
missing man's suitcase from the plane before takeoff. When they inspected the suitcase, knowledge 
about May 15's bomb designs allowed them to discover the explosives and the barometric fuse. It 
appears that al Umari tried to carry out two, nearly simultaneous, major attacks.56 
Al Umari later launched several other attacks, including an attempted bombing of an El Al flight 
from Berlin to Tel Aviv and a similar attempt against a Lufthansa aircraft. However, attention from 
Western intelligence agencies was inhibiting his organization's ability to operate. Eventually, Western 
intelligence discovered the link between al Umari's group and the Iraqi government. Western 
pressure and several botched operations led the Iraqis to drop their support of al Umari. By 1985, 
the May 15 Organization was no longer operational. 
 
Conclusion  
The PFLP pioneered strategic innovations starting in the late 1960’s, adopting new patterns of 
behavior radically different from those seen before. These new behaviors perfectly fit the definition 
of terrorist innovation offered by Crenshaw57 and serve as a useful proof-of-concept. A combination 
of external structural factors and managerial ambitions within the organization allowed the PFLP’s 	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commanders to develop a groundbreaking offensive policy and to expand its range of targets 
exponentially. Making the international public the target audience for their attacks −	  rather than the 
Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab publics as they had before −	  was a significant conceptual evolution in 
terrorist strategy.  
 
This evolution resulted from the PFLP’s belief that it could violently coerce the global community 
to dramatically change its attitude to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and force the outside world to 
intervene on Palestinians’ behalf. Through this new brand of attack, the PFLP hoped to induce the 
world to regard the Palestinians as a nation in exile—rather than refugees to be resettled in Arab 
countries—and to treat them accordingly.  
The colossal defeat Israel handed Arab nations during the Six-Day War, along with the subsequent 
failure of guerrilla warfare in the newly occupied territories, caused the PFLP to construct a new 
paradigm, pursuing Palestinian nationalist goals within the broader vision of international revolution.  
The longstanding partnership and great trust between PFLP leader George Habash and his 
operations chief, Waddia Haddad, became a central component in the PFLP's ability to develop a 
new and revolutionary terrorist strategy. These factors also allowed Haddad to implement this 
strategy with the full backing of the organization’s leader and to receive the necessary resources to 
fully support it.  
That the PFLP and Waddia Haddad were able to personally procure extensive training, funding, 
logistical support, and shelter from several Arab regimes, as well as the Soviet Union, significantly 
increased their ability to run an expansive global campaign for an extended period of time.  
Haddad’s leadership style, his creativity, his deep personal involvement in planning and 
management, his dedicated terrorist unit, and his independent faction are what fostered the 
innovative tactical approach employed by the PFLP and its offshoots.  For nearly a decade, terrorist 
attacks planned and executed at the international level were methodical, intensive, daring, and lethal, 
making international terrorism a permanent and significant factor on the international stage, and 
whose tactics were copied by Palestinian and other groups for years to come.  
Choosing the aviation industry as the central target for attacks perfectly suited the goals of the 
organization. Hijacking airplanes was the first step. This was soon followed by a series of tactical 
innovations (defined by Crenshaw as “changes in method rather than strategic conceptualization... 
typically involv[ing] new weapons or targets... occur[ing] within strategies rather than replacing 
them”). Initially, attacks against airplanes used RPGs as airliners were landing or taking off. Next, 
the PFLP continued by planting bombs on planes, attacking planes and travelers on the ground, and 
finally attacking airline counters.58 This tactical expansion was wholly organic and suited the main 
idea: putting this central, multi-national, highly lucrative branch of the global economy squarely in 
the organization’s crosshairs. The attack on aviation guaranteed that media attention would be 
secured and that the economy of developed nations would suffer. Through this new approach, 
world leaders and the global community would take notice of the Palestinian issue.  
The scope of the organization's strategy dynamically and continually expanded as its operations 
succeeded. Along with the initial motivation to move into the international arena, these operations 	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were also dedicated to serving the goals of international revolution and the PFLP’s Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. The organization’s cooperation with foreign terrorist organizations was an expression of 
this ideology (although it also constituted payment for services rendered by these organizations). 
Terrorist attacks against Arab targets also expressed this spirit and served the goals of the so-called 
"revolutionary" Arab states which supported the PFLP against the "reactionary" Arab regimes. The 
motives for these attacks included securing the release of comrades who had been arrested while 
working with the organization.  
This case study suggests a set of features that organizations must exhibit in order to be considered 
truly innovative. Beyond the simple use of innovative tactics, organizations must (almost always) 
possess some or all of the following features, which shape the character of their innovation:  
• First, a state of distress which derives from a sense of marginality and an enduring lack of 
progress, causing frustration and leading towards a desire to drastically change the situation.  
• Second, a determined, cohesive (or centralist) leadership, which supports and enables 
innovation.  
• Third, a charismatic, entrepreneurial leadership, with high operational capabilities, that can 
inspire innovation.  
• Fourth, successful operations based on innovative planning.  
• Fifth, influence that outlasts the organization over the long run.  
Many of the nations targeted by the PFLP’s new strategy did not readily identify the revolution it 
represented, which contributed significantly to the spread of the PFLP’s methods and the continued 
utility of terrorism today. One of the reasons for this slow reaction was the lack of understanding 
regarding the principles of international terrorism, the ideology in which these principles were 
rooted, and a widespread belief that giving in to the demands of terrorist organizations would 
placate them. This led other organizations around the world to adopt the PFLP strategy, imitating 
and improving upon its methods. Other countries, such as Israel, developed both defensive and 
offensive countermeasures against the sources of international terrorism to interdict and prevent 
attacks. 
Along with the success of the PFLP and its influence on other Palestinian groups, its international 
operations created tensions within the organization itself, with its colleagues and competitors in the 
Palestinian camp, as well as with the nations who’d suffered from its attacks. All of these factors led 
the Haddad faction to break away from the main group and embark upon an independent career 
sponsored by patron states. Countermeasures enacted in response to Haddad’s tactics foiled many 
of his operations, led to the imprisonment of his comrades and, eventually, the early death of this 
innovator and leader of international terrorist actions. For a number of years after his death, 
Haddad’s successors enacted tactically innovative operations similar to those Haddad himself had 
launched, but were ultimately neutralized by a wide spread counter-terrorist campaign that included 
intelligence and political action against sponsoring states.  
In retrospect, seen from a contemporary perspective, it can be said that locating innovative terrorist 
initiatives and their agents before disaster strikes is a difficult and complex challenge, which requires 
the ability to identify those groups or networks prone to strategic innovation.  
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Close surveillance of terrorist groups with a revolutionary agenda and a particularly destructive 
record, which display innovative tendencies and experiment with inventive tactics, will allow security 
forces to focus their efforts and isolate such groups from other organizations around the world. This 
can be done only through a deep understanding of the ideology, world view, inner discourse, and 
state of mind among the leaders such groups. Close analysis of these organizations’ operational 
leaders has critical importance; this would allow security forces to isolate these organizations before, 
or shortly after, they begin their innovative campaign, ensuring that, even if they do succeed, they 
will not inspire others to copy their tactics, as happened with the PFLP.  
It appears today that there are two potential areas in which certain terrorist networks are moving 
towards innovation. The first is CBRN operations −	   chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
attacks. The second consists of operations against critical infrastructures (such as those which 
control mass transit systems, energy, and communications facilities), plus economic and trade hubs. 
As the dramatic 9/11 attacks have already proven, terrorists sometimes develop innovations that are 
relatively simple yet surprising in their tactical originality and daring—innovations that are 
considered “illogical” even though their success is obvious even to the unbelieving eyes of 
intelligence agencies. 
One of the inescapable conclusions of the these cases is that, despite their differing characteristics, 
the necessary preparations left a trail that could have been detected in advance, or at least 
understood in its systemic context after the fact, leading to a swift response to prevent future 
attacks. A lack of willingness to quickly and effectively confront the sources of international 
terrorism and to eliminate innovative leaders from the arena is what gives terrorist innovation 
enough breathing space to become routine. If an organization's methods are successful and 
demonstrate that imitation will generate results at a low cost while advancing the organization's 
agenda, innovation is likely to persist.  
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